Monrovia, Liberia – A new multi-billion dollar rail concession in Liberia spearheaded by Ivanhoe Liberia Ltd. (formerly HPX) and founded by controversial mining magnate Robert Friedland is sparking public outcry. Despite the Concession and Access Agreement (CAA) being signed and forwarded for legislative ratification, Liberians are wary. Unlike the usual fanfare for foreign investment, this deal has been shrouded in secrecy and raises red flags about national sovereignty, unfair terms, and the troubling track record of its chief architect. Questions abound: Why was the agreement hastily signed behind closed doors? What about Guinea’s approval? And who exactly is Robert Friedland, the man behind Ivanhoe? The answers point to a potentially perilous deal for Liberia.
Pressure, Secrecy, and Foreign Influence
From the start, the Ivanhoe deal has been pushed with unusual urgency. In early July, the government invited media to witness the signing, only to bar them and sign the agreement behind closed doors on a weekend. This furtive approach immediately raised suspicions. Reports also suggest aggressive lobbying and veiled threats from Ivanhoe (formerly HPX) to force Liberia’s hand. The company enjoys U.S. Embassy backing as a “Commercial Advocate,” prompting claims that American officials threatened sanctions on anyone opposing the deal, although Ivanhoe denies improper U.S. involvement. Ironically, some U.S. voices warn the deal could benefit Chinese interests due to Friedland’s partnerships with Chinese firms. The result is a climate of pressure and confusion, undermining transparent decision-making. Lawmakers and even President Boakai’s own economic advisor have expressed reservations amid what one press account called “a storm brewing over a controversial rail deal”.
Guinea’s Ominous Silence
Perhaps the most glaring issue is the absence of Guinea, the source of the iron ore to be transported. The CAA explicitly makes access contingent on a Liberia-Guinea arrangement, yet Conakry has remained conspicuously silent. FrontPageAfrica reports that Liberia’s requests for Guinea’s consent have gone unanswered, even as the legislature moves toward ratification. This silence is deafening. It suggests Liberia might be gambling on a deal that Guinea’s military government does not support. In fact, Guinea is near completion of its own $18 billion Trans-Guinean Railway from the Simandou/Nimba range to a Guinean port. Guinea’s policy has been that its minerals must be exported via its own infrastructure. If Liberia ratifies Ivanhoe’s deal without Guinea’s blessing, the repercussions could be severe. Analysts warn of “stranded rail capacity, disrupted operations, and diplomatic tension” should Guinea later reject cross-border shipments. Under existing bilateral frameworks, Guinea’s written authorization is required for any transshipment; none has been given. Liberia, in effect, risks signing a 25-year commitment that may never materialize, or worse, that provokes a regional rift. It’s a major diplomatic and economic gamble.
Money Trails and Unanswered Questions
Scrutiny is also mounting over the money changing hands. According to the Ministry of Transport’s summary, Ivanhoe paid a hefty US$37 million “upfront” to Liberia’s previous administration. This payment – made before legislative approval – astonished lawmakers. Nimba County Senator Nya D. Twayen Jr. demanded to know “what that payment was for and how it was utilized”, insisting on accountability. The deal also promises Liberia $10 million upon ratification and another $15 million when physical rail access is granted. Alarmingly, there were attempts to slip these expected sums into the national budget before ratification, a move Senator Twayen blasted as creating “undue pressure… to hastily ratify the agreement without thorough scrutiny”. Such tactics recall the “bad agreements that benefited a few at the expense of local populations” – the very mistakes Twayen says “the days of… are over”.
Even more disturbing are allegations that the initial $35–37 million was a secret payoff to clinch the deal. A Liberian news analysis described it as a “blatant act of business corruption, designed to sway government decisions in HPX’s favor”. That payment was made under a non-ratified framework during former President Weah’s tenure, raising the specter of an illicit “signature bonus” that never reached state coffers. Who benefited from this money? Liberians have not been told, a red flag for a deal sold as being in the national interest.
The characters involved further fuel mistrust. Ivanhoe’s CEO, Bronwyn Barnes, and partners have been lobbying hard, but one key partner stands out: Robert Gumede, a South African businessman entangled in corruption scandals. Gumede has faced allegations of bribery and inflated contracts in South Africa’s COVID-19 response, and his Liberia ventures have sidestepped proper procurement procedures. His role in Ivanhoe’s “Liberty Corridor” project suggests a network of dubious actors behind the scenes. “Government business cannot be conducted based on friendships and gentleman’s agreements,” warned former Liberian Auditor General John Morlu, urging transparency. Indeed, the Ivanhoe deal’s opacity and cast of characters bear the hallmarks of a sweetheart arrangement – not the fair, mutually beneficial investment Liberians deserve.
Friedland’s Tainted Legacy
At the center of this storm is Ivanhoe’s founder, Robert Friedland, whose business reputation is deeply checkered. Friedland’s history of mining deals around the world reads like a cautionary tale. In Canada, he gained infamy in the 1990s for the Voisey’s Bay nickel deposit – dubbed “the richest… on the planet” – which he hyped and flipped for a fortune. But his fortune often came at others’ expense. Friedland has left behind a trail of environmental disasters so extensive he earned the nickname “Toxic Bob”. In the U.S., his Galactic Resources company operated the Summitville gold mine in Colorado, which in 1993 caused a cyanide spill so catastrophic it was called the “Exxon Valdez of the mining industry”, killing all life in 17 miles of river. Friedland evaded legal liability by resigning just in time, and U.S. taxpayers had to fund most of the $150 million cleanup. In 1995, a massive dam failure at his Omai gold mine in Guyana dumped 3.2 billion liters of cyanide-laced waste into rivers – one of the largest spills in history. Again, no reparations were paid, and Friedland walked away after a “timely” resignation.
This pattern – grand promises followed by environmental and social devastation with little accountability is well documented. The book “The Big Score: Robert Friedland, INCO, and the Voisey’s Bay Hustle” details how Friedland’s deals often enrich him while short-changing others. Friedland has shown willingness to partner with pariah regimes and war-torn countries if it serves his interests. He ventured into Myanmar in the 90s, partnering with the brutal junta on a copper mine, even as major companies shunned the country. A New Internationalist profile noted he even did business in conflict zones like Angola and Sierra Leone during civil wars. His modus operandi is to sway skeptical investors and officials with charismatic showmanship and “bullish predictions”, often bringing influential local figures in as stakeholders. As one observer put it, “he tells the story of his deals in such a compelling way that you feel you have to own the stock”. This “low cunning” extends to co-opting decision-makers, for example, Friedland cut Burmese generals into his ventures to secure access. Liberians would do well to ask: who in our power structure might be benefiting from the Ivanhoe deal behind the scenes? Given Friedland’s record, the public skepticism is more than justified.
Equally telling is Friedland’s attitude toward local communities. He infamously joked that a mining site in Mongolia was ideal because “there’s no people around… no NGOs… lots of room for waste dumps”. This dismissive mindset rings alarm bells for Nimba communities along the rail corridor who have “endured years of environmental degradation, loss of farmland, and displacement without proper redress”, as Senator Twayen laments. Ivanhoe is promising a Community Development Fund and jobs, but without ironclad, transparent commitments in the agreement, these could prove to be vague promises. Friedland’s past suggests that unless forced, community welfare is not his priority.
Parallels from Liberia’s Own Past
Liberia need not look far for lessons on problematic concessions. Past mining deals offer cautionary parallels. ArcelorMittal’s 2005 iron ore agreement, for instance, initially granted the company sweeping control over rail and port, until watchdogs exposed it as unfair and it was renegotiated. More blatantly, the Western Cluster iron ore concession a decade ago was essentially flipped by a shell company for quick profit. In 2010 Liberia awarded Western Cluster to a little-known firm, Elenilto Minerals, amid bribery allegations. Within months Elenilto sold a majority stake to India’s Sesa Goa for $90 million – money that went into private pockets while Liberia was left waiting for promised development. The project stalled for years, and even after resumption, Western Cluster has been accused of breaking promises and causing environmental damage, prompting President Boakai himself to threaten its closure. Another scandal involved Sable Mining, which in 2016 was exposed (by Global Witness) for attempting to bribe officials to get the Wologizi iron ore concession, a deal that fortunately never materialized. These episodes underscore a common theme: when concession deals are struck in haste, secrecy, or under undue influence, Liberia loses. Communities suffer, revenues vanish, and promised benefits often do not materialize. The Ivanhoe deal is ticking many of these same boxes, from opaque payments to questionable intermediaries and scant regard for local voices.
“A controversial rail deal linking Liberia and Guinea has drawn scrutiny at home and abroad. Critics fear a repeat of past concession blunders, with Liberia bearing all the risks while foreign actors reap the rewards.”
Conclusion: Stop, Scrutinize, or Suffer
In light of these findings, the Ivanhoe Liberia rail deal appears less a boon and more a potential booby trap. The terms of the CAA, as known, tie Liberia into a 25-year arrangement that might waive sovereign protections (through arbitration and immunity clauses) and prioritize a foreign company’s access over national control. Yet the very foundation – Guinea’s cooperation – is shaky or absent. No amount of U.S. “support” or investor spin should blind Liberia to these realities. The Legislature’s duty is to demand clarity on every clause: What happens if Guinea says no? Who pays for rail upgrades and how will Liberia recoup its asset value? Where exactly did that $37 million go? And how will communities along the route tangibly benefit, beyond lip service?
Liberia stands at a crossroads: either repeat the mistakes of “signing bad agreements” that mortgage the country’s future, or insist on a deal that truly serves the public interest. As global scrutiny grows, siding with transparency and prudence is the only way forward. The Ivanhoe deal, in its current opaque and pressure-laden form, risks becoming another case of Liberia being railroaded by powerful interests and a tycoon with a very questionable past. The nation can, and must, do better than to hitch its wagon to Robert Friedland’s locomotive without full assurances. The world is watching if Liberia will derail this dubious deal or be steamrolled once again.
